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Abstract
Israel has led the world in rolling out its COVID-19 vaccination program. This experience provides lessons that
others can learn from. It is, however, necessary to consider some national specificities, including the small size of
the country, its young population, and the political imperative to drive this program forward. Israel also has a
number of other advantages, including a strong public health infrastructure. The lessons that can be learnt include
the importance of coordinating delivery mechanisms with the inevitable prioritisation of groups within the
population, timely deployment of a skilled cadre of health workers, a recognition that not everyone in the
population shares in the benefits of digital connectedness, the need to reach out to disadvantaged groups, based
on an understanding of the barriers that they face, and the importance of placing COVID-19 vaccination within a
comprehensive response to the pandemic.
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What worked in Israel and why?
As governments across the world race to roll out vaccin-
ation programmes against COVID-19, many are looking
to Israel to understand how it has led the way, adminis-
tering a first dose of the Pfizer-BioNtech vaccine to over
1 in 10 Israelis within 2 weeks of its approval [1]. Mean-
while, other countries, including the United States and
many in Europe, are struggling to get their vaccination
programs off the ground, with many accounts of doses
going to waste from missed appointments or dosing
challenges.
So what can we learn from the Israeli experience? In
the accompanying paper, Rosen and colleagues set out a
series of reasons why Israel has been so successful [2]. In
this brief commentary, and drawing on the experiences
of European countries in the COVID-19 response so far,
we seek to draw some lessons.
As Rosen and colleagues note, Israel has some intrinsic
advantages. With only 9.3 million people, it requires
only a very small share of the world production of vac-
cine. It also has a relatively young population, making it
easier to deliver a policy that prioritises older people.
Also, its population density is relatively high, avoiding
the need for very complex logistical arrangements to
reach outlying areas. Yet, some other countries also have
these advantages, to a greater or lesser degree, and they
have not been so successful.
One obvious factor in Israel’s success has been the
presence of a mass vaccination plan. It should be obvi-
ous that the implementation of a mass vaccination
programme is a complex task, both in the normal mean-
ing of the term “complex” and in its particular use in sys-
tems theory. While other countries focused initially on
the acquisition of the stocks of vaccine, it is now appar-
ent that many failed to understand the importance of
putting in place all of the structures and processes ne-
cessary to move the vaccines from warehouses into peo-
ple’s arms. As we have described elsewhere [3], this
requires a series of interconnected subsystems, including
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those for maintaining an accurate register of the popula-
tion, distributing the vaccine to facilities where it can be
administered, with the added complication of maintain-
ing a cold chain, ensuring that there are adequate num-
bers of trained staff to administer it, and mechanisms to
identify differences in uptake within the population and
responding to them. Crucially, these elements of a com-
plex system are not self-organising. Somebody needs to
be in charge with a clear vision of what they want to
achieve. While this seems to be the case in Israel, it ap-
pears to have been lacking in many other countries or
developed after vaccine delivery started, as was the case
in the UK [4].
In reflecting why Israel seems to have got it right, it is
necessary to consider some national specificities. We
cannot avoid the observation by Israeli commentators
that the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, fa-
cing yet another uncertain election, has his own political
reasons for wanting to demonstrate success [5, 6]. While
Israel seemed to do well in the early stages of the pan-
demic, it was unable to maintain this situation and has
since experienced two large waves of infection. The abil-
ity to claim responsibility for a very successful vaccin-
ation programme has obvious attractions. In contrast, in
some other countries that have fared much worse, polit-
ical leaders have been disengaged, in denial, or have ac-
tively rejected scientific evidence [7].
A second consideration is the high degree of prepared-
ness, not just for a pandemic, but for other threats to
health. Like the Republic of Korea [8], Israel has consid-
erable experience with mobilisation of the population in
time of crisis. The infrastructure necessary for this to
happen offers governments scope to act in ways that are
denied to others that lack such organisation and
capacity.
Neither of these factors are especially generalisable.
So, what can others take from the Israeli experience in
vaccination scale up?
Lessons for other countries
First, given the global shortage of vaccines, which is in-
evitable, and given the magnitude of the task of scaling
up production of a completely new product, it is neces-
sary to prioritise groups within countries. Many coun-
tries have done so, typically focusing on older people,
who are at greater risk of dying, and health or social care
workers. Some, such as France, have also prioritised
those in public-facing jobs, such as public transport
workers and teachers. However, Israel has taken this a
step further, in a way that some countries have failed to
do, by linking this prioritisation to different delivery sys-
tems. Thus, different organisations are responsible for
each of the four priority groups in the Israeli
programme. Those over 60 or with pre-existing medical
conditions were covered by the four non-profit health
plans, which hold information on each individual’s med-
ical history. Nursing home residents were covered by the
national emergency services organisation Magen David
Adom. Health workers were vaccinated by the organisa-
tions that employed them. Again, Israel has an advantage
that is not available to some other countries, in that it
has very well developed information systems [9], so that
the different organisations involved in vaccination can
identify those for whom they are responsible and follow
them up as necessary. Notably, Israel is one of the few
countries with a comprehensive population-based child-
hood web-based immunization registry. The platform of
the national registry was rapidly adapted to the COVID-
19 vaccine campaign, taking advantage of the single
unique identifier for each Israeli resident that is used in
all health care facilities. The registry also allows follow
up and assessment of post vaccination adverse events as
well as providing real-world vaccine effectiveness data.
Second, every country requires a trained workforce to
deliver the vaccination programme. Again, Israel has the
advantage of a cadre of well-trained community nurses
with long experience in vaccination. Other countries
have had to divert health professionals from acute care,
a highly undesirable necessity at a time when many
health systems are being overwhelmed with patients suf-
fering from the acute effects of Covid 19. Both of these
considerations emphasise the importance of investing in
health infrastructure, whether in the form of trained
staff, facilities, or information technology in normal
times, so that there is adequate capacity when a crisis
strikes [10].
A third observation in the Israeli experience was the
problems that arose in booking appointments in the ini-
tial days of the campaign. Like many other countries,
they relied, to a considerable extent, on the use of online
scheduling and call centres. However, while these ap-
proaches have proven very successful in other aspects of
modern life, such as online shopping or travel reserva-
tions, it is easy to forget how those who take advantage
of these opportunities are not representative of the
population as a whole, or of those in the priority groups.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the existence,
in many wealthy countries, of large groups of people
who are in effect excluded from the digital world [11],
for example due to lack of internet connectivity or lan-
guage problems in communicating with health providers
by phone [12]. Until this is addressed at some time in
the future, it will still be necessary to make use of the
traditional forms of interaction between the individual
and the state.
Fourth, as Rosen and colleagues note, there have been
particular challenges in reaching some groups. While
some earlier challenges in achieving vaccine uptake in
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the ultra-orthodox Jewish community have been ad-
dressed, uptake was also initially low in Israeli Arab areas
and it is taking longer to address that challenge [13]. Dis-
advantaged communities in all countries have borne the
brunt of the pandemic, with higher rates of infection [14]
and worse outcomes [15]. They have also suffered most
from the economic and social consequences of responses.
In essence, COVID-19 has shone a light on existing frac-
tures in societies. Consequently, any failure to reach these
groups will exacerbate existing inequalities. Consequently,
a comprehensive vaccination strategy must include a sys-
tem to monitor uptake in different groups, something that
is impossible in the many countries that fail to collect data
on ethnicity and occupation, and to understand why some
are excluded. This will require mixed methods research
coupled with co-creation of contextually appropriate feas-
ible solutions [16].
Finally, while this commentary and the accompanying
paper focus on vaccination, this is only one element of a
comprehensive COVID-19 strategy. It must be accompan-
ied by measures to drive down levels of circulating infec-
tion and keep them low with well functioning find, test,
trace, isolate and support systems [17]. Crucially, while
the existing vaccines have been shown to reduce the risk
of people becoming ill, they may be less successful in pre-
venting infection and onward transmission. There is a
danger that politicians will see vaccination as a magic bul-
let that will, somehow, make the threat from COVID-19
go away. It will not, and we must not ignore the risk of po-
tential vaccine escape mutations emerging, something that
is more likely if high levels of virus continue to circulate.
It is also critical that any vaccine rollout is accompan-
ied by appropriate post-manufacturing surveillance to
document the real world efficacy of the different vac-
cines in different patient groups [18]. This is especially
important in Israel where any issues will become appar-
ent sooner than elsewhere and where the information
system, mentioned earlier, facilitates this. Thus, as ex-
pected based on the Phase 3 trial [19], a single dose of
the vaccine offers only partial protection, and only after
about 12 days. Those who have received the first dose
should not count on protection, and indeed, in Israel
17% of seriously ill persons as of mid-January 2021 had
received a single dose of vaccine [20]. Even after a sec-
ond dose, individuals should maintain precautions
against exposure until the level of circulating virus in the
community falls to very low levels.
Conclusion
There is much to be learned from the experiences of
those in the forefront of rolling out vaccination pro-
grammes, such as Israel, but this should include a whole
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